During the Indonesian Confrontation (1963-1966), unrest within Indonesia probably accounted for the spasmodic involvement of Indonesian Forces against the Federated States of Malaysia. America remained aloft from the conflict although having been willingly supported by British Commonwealth countries in Korea, as she (US) was attempting to introduce democracy within Indonesia and more importantly, negotiating for long term sales of oil from Indonesia at the time. Had President Sukarno been singly focused with his threat to crush Malaysia, then the conflict may have escalated to a full scale war, and America would have had to support the British Commonwealth countries.
By 1965 Indonesia had become a dangerous cockpit of social and political antagonisms. The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) with rapid growth aroused the hostility of Islamic groups and the military. The ABRI-PKI balancing act, which supported Guided Democracy regime of President Sukarno, was going askew. One of the most serious points of contention was the desire of the PKI to establish a "fifth force" of armed peasants and workers.
One of the biggest massacres in the history of Indonesia took place in 1965/66, when from half a million to two million people were killed in the suppression of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI).
The following article appeared in the Spartanburg, South Carolina Herald-Journal on May 19, 1965, then in the San Francisco Examiner on May 20, 1965, the Washington Post on May 21, 1965, and the Boston Globe on May 23, 1965. The version below is from the Examiner:
"Confused reports of Officers plotting, coups and countercoups which
filtered through to the Western press were the first indication of a major
revolutionary upheaval in Indonesia.
The recent events unfolded against a now familiar background of social and
economic crisis in a backward country. The regime of Sukarno, despite the
superficial appearance of stability has been exposed as rotten to the core. The
analysis of the Indonesian events provides us with an object lessen in the fate
of Bonapartism, bourgeois and proletarian."
Since the end of the war (WW11), all the countries of the so-called "third
world" have passed through a period of uninterrupted social convulsions, as the
result of the growing gap in the terms of trade with the advanced capitalist
countries. The Indonesian economy is a model of bankruptcy. At one time,
Indonesia was a rice-surplus area; now it has to import 150,000 tons of rice
every year. The once flourishing tin and rubber export industries have dwindled
away. Only oil remains as an-imported earner of dollars.
The Indonesian economy is heavily in debt to the world banking community,
especially to US bankers, Each year, the budget deficit doubles, The expected
figures for this year is around 1,000 billion rupiahs. The value of the rupiah
has sunk to a hundredth of its legal value, as the result of the chronic
inflation which in the past six years has caused the cost of living to increase
by 2,000 %.
In spite of this catastrophic economic collapse, the State spends 1,000 million
US dollars a year on arms. i.e. 75% of the budget. The Bonapartist regime is
riddled with corruption. In the midst of mass privation, low wages and a huge
housing problem, Sukarno and his elite live like kings. Sukarno occupies a white
mansion; formally the residence of the Dutch governor; surrounded by sumptuous
furniture and expensive works of art. "Its three splendid state-rooms are
museum-like in scope and feeling. Each is lavishly draped, carpeted and
furnished. Each is hung with a fragment of Sukarno's extensive collection of
heroic canvasses." Under his direction, huge sums have been lavished on prestige
buildings like the Hotel Indonesia in Djakarta where, to quote the Sunday Times,
"Three million people, mostly poor, live .... in low buildings ...mostly falling
apart."
Indonesia boasts one of the most inept and useless of all parasitic ruling
cliques. "We are not facing economic difficulties" Sukarno blithely protests.
"The Indonesian people are faring well, reasonably well. Just compare us with
India or some other countries. We have a new variety of rice that will give
twice as much production as normal rice. It is quite an achievement for our own
research centre. I wrote a poem about it, I was so happy. But it is
untranslatable."
Unfortunately, Sukarno's creditors do not seem to have developed a taste for
untranslatable poetry as a substitute for economic progress. They expected the
economy to improve after the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia in 1963;
to no avail. The World Bank attempted to lure Sukarno into deflation by an offer
of additional loans to the tune of 142 million pounds. Instead of taking up the
offer, Sukarno proceeded to burn the British Embassy in Djakarta and declare war
on Malaysia - a move which cut off a further 200 million dollars worth of
foreign trade. The US. was concerned. In reply to repeated American demands to
shore up the economy, Sukarno announced to the world; "Economics bores me." To
the very last, he maintained that in twenty years, Indonesia would be "the
richest country in the world".
Faith may be able to move mountains but it had no effect in moving the
Indonesian economy out of the red. The poverty and hardships of the masses led
to an extraordinarily rapid growth of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). With
the economy sliding downhill fast, Sukarno was forced to nationalise increasing
numbers of foreign enterprises. To do this, he was obliged to lean on the
support of the PKI - a process which did not go unnoticed in Washington.
Menshevik policy of the PKI
The whole lesson of the post-war period is that the elementary tasks of the
bourgeois (democratic) revolution in backward countries cannot be solved on the
basis of capitalist property relations. The weak bourgeoisies of the ex-colonial
countries are too inextricably bound up with international finance capital to
carry the nationalist revolution through to the end. Nor can they compete with
their advanced industrial competitors for world markets. As a result, there is a
constant deterioration of their economic status vis-a-vis the advanced
capitalist countries.
The ruining of the economies of backward countries creates conditions of acute
and permanent social crisis. On the one hand the old self-contained peasant
society is steadily under-mined, on the other hand, the capitalist class is
unable to put across its forms on the whole of society. The rise of military
police states all over the "third world" is merely a surface expression of the
inability of the colonial bourgeoisie to solve the problems of their own
revolution. Only by the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat, in
alliance with the poor peasants, can the backward countries begin to solve their
economic and social problems.
Nowhere in the "Third World" has the workers movement made such rapid strides in
the last decade as in Indonesia. The PKI, which had virtually ceased to exist
after the abortive coup of 1948, has grown into the third largest Communist
Party in the world, only the Chinese and Russian Parties being larger. Its total
paid up membership is three million, It commands the support of ten million
trade unionists and organised peasants. Most important of all, it claims the
allegiance of 4O% of the Indonesian army. Politically, it is aligned with Peking
in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and maintains close contact with the Chinese
Stalinists. A revolutionary combination, one might think. But one would be
wrong; The policy of the PKI is one of blatant class collaboration. Since the
1948 fiasco, the PKI leadership has attempted to prove its own impotence by
ingratiating itself with Sukarno. All traces of revolutionary ideology have been
systematically deleted from the Party Programme. Thus the 1962 Programme and
Constitution of the PKI outlined the Partys task as the establishment of a
"people's democratic state". And what might this queer specimen be; Socialism?
Capitalism? Worker State? The Programme goes on to clarify the class content of
this "peoples democratic state". It would be a "democracy of a new type", based,
not upon the working class, but on a bloc of workers and peasants with a strange
and motley collection of "Allies". This latter-day popular front would include
"the urban petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, the national bourgeoisie, the
advanced aristocratic elements, and patriotic elements in general
From such confusion, it is difficult to extract any positive conclusion
concerning the class nature of the "people democratic state" since the above is
simply a list of all classes and strata of present day bourgeois Indonesia. One
might therefore justly conclude that the "revolutionary" Peking oriented
Programme of the PKI is the maintenance of the status quo!
In all its documents, the PKI goes out of its way to avoid all mention of the
dictatorship of the proletariat. Instead, the PKI refers to the "authority" of
the "people", a formula which offends no one. The class collaboration of the PKI
attained its most bare faced expression in 1955 when it openly advocated a
national coalition, and offered to water down its already insipid programme to a
list of entirely non communist aims.
The unutterably philistine mentality of the PKI leadership is revealed in all
the pronouncements of its chief "theoretician", Aidit. As always with Stalinism,
the "theory" is merely a crude apology for the betrayals of the leadership.
Thus, using the sophist argument of "stages" Aidit puts off the question of the
socialist revolution to the far distant future, "When we complete the first
stage of our revolution which is now in progress, we can enter into friendly
consultation with other progressive elements in our society and, without an
armed struggle lead the country towards socialist revolution. After all, the
national capitalists in our country are both weak and disorganised. At present,
in our national democratic revolution, we are siding with them and fighting a
common battle of expelling foreign economic domination from this soil''.
The Aidit argument condemns itself. If the national bourgeoisie is so weak and
disorganised, all the more reason to sweep them aside and set up a workers and
peasants government. As a matter of fact, as Lenin pointed out a hundred times,
it is precisely the weakness of the national bourgeoisie that makes them a
reactionary stumbling block in the path of the democratic revolution in backward
countries. They doubt their ability to control the forces unleashed by a civil
war, they equivocate, and finally they are driven into the arms of reaction out
of fear of their own working class. For this reason it is entirely reactionary
to attempt to separate mechanically the democratic and socialist phases of the
revolution in backward countries. Either the democratic revolution ''grows
over'' into the dictatorship of the proletariat, or it succumbs to the hammer
blows of reaction.
The "Leninist" position of Aidit and co. is in fact identical to that of the
Mensheviks against whom Lenin waged a relentless struggle right up to 1917. The
Mensheviks argued that the socialist revolution was out of the Question in
Russia, because the bourgeois democratic revolution had yet to take place. Thus,
the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat was relegated by them to a
distant (and therefore safe) future, fifty, a hundred, or even three hundred
years hence. First we complete the "first stage'' then, when this is "completely
attained" , we "enter into friendly agreements'' with those who might be
interested in the ''second stage''. A very pretty schema.
Events were posed altogether differently by history, which, alas , does not deem
it at all necessary to follow the dictates of a Plekhanov or an Aidit. 1n 1905,
the Mensheviks were forced with a clear choice: proletarian revolution, or
reaction? While the workers struggled with reaction in the streets, Plekhanov
gave his reply: "They should not have taken to arms". Aidit today faces his
1905.
Palace Revolution
Bonapartist Government arises out of a social crisis, where no one class, group
or party is capable of achieving stable government. The bonapartist dictator
directly or indirectly basing himself upon the army, achieves political
equilibrium by ''balancing'' the antagonistic interests - playing off one class
against another. This is what imparts to the bonapartist dictator his peculiar
aura of isolation and individualism; because he represents no particular
interest, (other than his own) the illusion is created of a power standing above
society and regulating it "in the national interest''. In reality bonapartism
always represents defence of the status quo and therefore in the last analysis
always comes down on the side of the ruling class.
The delicate balance of forces which is the precondition for bonapartism is
bound to he temporary and precarious. Sooner or later equilibrium is destroyed
and illusory stability gives way to civil war. Thus, a Bonapartist regime must
be considered, monolithic or paternalistic facade notwithstanding, as a regime
of transition which is the prelude to the victory of revolution or reaction.
At 0600hrs. on Thursday 30th September, 1965 Radio Djakarta broadcast an
announcement that an obscure officer of the palace guard, a Lt-Col Untung had
President Sukarno under protective guard, and that loyalist forces had crushed a
CIA take-over plot. Within hours, Radio Djakarta issued another statement that
President Sukarno was safe and well and that a Communist coup had been crushed
by Gen Nasution. The bonapartist illusion was shattered.
Initial reactions in the West were that this was just another power struggle
caused by the illness or death of Sukarno. The Times, ever tasteful, thought
that he had "ceased to be a factor on the Indonesian political scene''. As it
happened, Sukarno was alive, but the Times had grasped the correlation of'
forces admirably. In the whole course of the struggle Sukarno and his Cabinet
were pitifully isolated. The government was suspended in mid-air. The real
political struggle had passed into the streets.
Little by little the picture became clearer. We may accept the accusation of a
CIA plot and an attempt by the Stalinist middle stream of the officer caste to
liquidate the generals and forestall a right wing coup planned for October 5th.
1965, as an accurate outline of the initial upheaval. Sukarno's illness, his
moves against foreign enterprises and his increasing dependence on the PKI, on
top of the general bankruptcy of the Indonesian economy would be more than
enough to interest the State Department in secret negotiations with the
reactionary upper stratum of the officer caste (Gen Nasution is virulently
anti-Communist). On the other hand, the army generals would need little
persuading to liquidate the hated influence of the PKI and establish open
military rule.
As a matter of fact, we have certain proof of at least one previous attempt of
the CIA to oust Sukarno. In the late 50s, an anti-Sukarno guerrilla movement
developed in Sumatra. The pilot of a rebel plane shot down after bombarding an
air-field was a CIA agent called Allen Lawrence Pope. He was sentenced to death,
but later reprieved on Sukarno's personal order, "because I did not want to
spoil the good relationship between Indonesia and America''.
That a rightist plot existed need not be seriously doubted. The PKI, as we have
seen, was quite satisfied with the status quo. On the other hand, it is clear
that the so-called ''Revolutionary Council'' of Untung was a Stalinist front
organisation composed of prominent Stalinists, fellow travellers and political
non-entities. The ''respectable" members of the Council disowned it immediately
Nasution looked like gaining the upper hand. There can be no doubt that the PKI
leadership was behind this preventative coup. It has emerged, however, that
Sukarno himself knew all about it at least 24 hours in advance, having been
informed of the generals plot by the pro-PKI Air Chief, Dhani. Sukarno was in
his palace in Djakarta protected by the palace guard on the night of the coup,
but fled to Bogor with the help of Dhani when the fighting got out of hand.
The treachery of the PKI now stands revealed. With three million members, ten
million supporters and 40% of the army under its control, its sole concern was
to keep the masses out of the struggle, to confine it to a palace revolution.
Instead of publishing full details of the right wing plot, instead of mobilising
the masses in a general strike and appealing to its supporters in the army to
disarm their officers and join hands with the workers for the overthrow of the
whole rotten regime, they made a secret pact with Sukarno to murder the
offending generals. Unfortunately for them Nasution escaped and called out his
troops. The palace revolution crumbled at a touch.
The gathering reaction
It is an elementary rule of revolutionary strategy that it is always an
advantage if the other side is seen to strike the first blow, thus justifying
the actions as self-defence. The PKI by its criminal policy, far from keeping
the generals out, handed them power on a plate.
The provocative actions of the wretched ''Revolutionary Council" proved an
excellent weapon in the hands of Nasution. Moslem reaction was incited. The PKI
headquarters in Djakarta was stormed and burned by a mob of several thousand
youths, shouting ''Kill Aidit". Mobs roamed the streets, sticking up posters
reading "Crush the Communists". A mob outside the American Embassy chanted "Long
Live America", A mass rally of 500,000 demanded action against all who
participated in the "September 30th Movement". The murder of the six generals
and the senseless killing of the six year old daughter of Nasutian, were used to
fan the flames of reaction. The demands forwarded by this demonstration to the
government (i.e. to Nasution ) showed that the programme of reaction has already
crystallised.
It will not be long before the reactionary generals, with great reluctance of
course, submit to the pressing demands of the mob. The above programme will be
implemented.
And what of the PKI? Instead of pursuing a vigorous offensive against reaction
which even now, at the "11th hour" could save the party, the leadership remains
prostrate before Sukarno. While Communists struggle with the mobs of reaction,
the PKI continues to be represented in the Sukarno cabinet, supporting his
demagogic appeals for "national unity", a return to the old stability, etc.
Ominously, however, Aidit has gone into hiding.
Aidit may hide, but there is no hiding place for the three million Communist
workers and peasants who are placed at the mercy of a bloody reaction. In the
teeth of all the cowardly appeals of the leadership, the mighty PKI masses are
clearly moving into action. The revolt in Central Java has spread to Sumatra,
and is still growing. Indonesia has been split asunder. The Daily Telegraph,
with some insight, analysed the situation in an editorial of October 12th. 1965,
entitled:
''It is plain from the events of the past ten days in Indonesia that it is not another palace coup that has rocked the Sukarno Republic, but a spreading civil war. The land of confrontation is confronting itself, The three heads of this dragon, Moslem, nationalist, Communist are biting at each other, and fighting has spread from Java to Sumatra and the long smouldering rivalry of forces over which Dr Sukarno presided for so long has burst into flame. If the army suspected a Communist coup, it was clearly surprised by its sudden ruthlessness and disorganised by the loss of its six murdered generals. Now it is clear that Dr Sukarno is in Army protection, that he has countenanced its campaigns against the Communist guerrillas and finally abandoned the pretence that his Nassakom or United Front still exists.''
The behaviour of the PKI leadership was craven to the last. To the very last
moment before Sukarno switched sides, they identified themselves with him and
his demagogic appeals to national unity. More than likely they still do. They
behave like a cur that licks its master's hand as he kicks it in the belly.
Where the state power is openly challenged in a civil war, all possibilities of
"moderation", of a ''middle way" vanish in thin air. If Sukarno emerges, at the
end of the civil war, as the man in charge it cannot be on the same basis as
before. He will no longer be a one Man dictator, keeping himself on top by
balancing the classes, but as a puppet of the generals. The old order is
irrevocably lost. It was both stupid and reactionary of the PKI leaders to
appeal for its restoration.
It is by no means certain, however, that the revolt will be crushed. True, the
PKI leaders have still not called an insurrection. But the PKI masses are
reacting spontaneously to the threat of reaction. Their great numerical
strength, and the complete rottenness of Indonesian society may yet bring
victory. It is not impossible that the PKI leadership, or a section of that
leadership, will realise the futility of attempts to restore the status quo, and
support the development of a mass insurrection. If so, then this would certainly
take the form of a protracted guerrilla war, the classical weapon of Stalinism
in the Colonial Revolution.
More likely, however, the PKI leadership will carry their work of disruption to
the bitter and bloody end. Ether they will actively discourage their members
from fighting, in a craven and quite utopian effort to conciliate the forces of
reaction, or they may temporarily lend their support to a guerrilla war, or even
a general strike, not with a view to seizing power, but simply in order to
obtain a stronger hand in secret negotiations with Nasution and/or Sukarno.
Whatever the outcome, the disastrous policies of the Stalinist leadership in
Indonesia, will certainly have the initial result of causing widespread
disillusionment of the masses in that country. A series of defeats of the
present revolutionary movement would usher in a whole period of militarist
reaction resting on the apathy and bitterness of the PKI masses. Not for nothing
did the Daily Telegraph editorial express evident satisfaction at the chaos in
Indonesia. The defeat of the Indonesian proletariat would be the best possible
buttress to the crumbling edifice of Malaysia."
President Sukarno was stripped of Presidential power on 12th. march 1966, however remained a symbolic President and a puppet of the "Generals" until a year and a day later when he was ousted on 12th. March 1967, replaced as President by General Suharto.
Indonesia - Competing World Views; The Indonesian Confrontation - a US
view(1963)
History of Borneo, Malaya and the
Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation
Sukano, the
Coup of 1965.
